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Abstract
Language-based approaches to information security have led to the development of security type systems
that permit the programmer to describe confidentiality policies on data. Security type systems are usually
intended to enforce noninterference, a property that requires that high-security information not affect low-
security computation. However, in practice, noninterference is often too restrictive—the desired policy does
permit some information leakage.
To compensate for the strictness of noninterference, practical approaches include some mechanism for de-
classifying high-security information. But such declassification is potentially dangerous, and its use should
be restricted to prevent unintended information leaks. Zdancewic and Myers previously introduced the
notion of robust declassification in an attempt to capture the desired restrictions on declassification, but
that work did not propose a method for determining when a program satisfies the robust declassification
condition.
This paper motivates robust declassification and shows that a simple change to a security type system
can enforce it. The idea is to extend the lattice of security labels to include integrity constraints as well
as confidentiality constraints and then require that the decision to perform a declassification have high
integrity.
1 Introduction
Security-typed languages track information flow within programs to enforce security
properties such as data confidentiality and integrity. Typically, these languages are
intended to enforce noninterference [17,6], a property that requires that confidential
data not affect the publicly visible behavior (outputs, timing, etc.) of a computation.
Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide
strong guarantees that confidentiality and integrity are maintained. However, there
are several reasons why strict noninterference as a security policy may be undesir-
able:
• Sometimes the required policy intentionally permits some amount of information
flow—confidentiality may conditionally depend on some other factors. For exam-
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ple, Alice may be willing to release her private data to Bob after he pays for it,
but not otherwise.
• The policy may require that information be kept secret for only some fixed du-
ration. For example, an on-line auction service must release the value of the
winning bid after the auction closes.
• The rate at which information is intentionally leaked may be considered too
slow to pose a security threat. For example, a password-checking function of
an operating system manages on confidential passwords, but even denying access
reveals tiny amounts of information about the correct password.
• Noninterference is the desired policy, but the program analysis is not able to
justify the security of some operations. For example, the encryption function
of a cryptographic library takes confidential data and makes it public, but the
justification that this is secure lies outside the analysis of the security type system.
Consequently, realistic systems include a means of downgrading—allowing the
security label of the data to be made more public. For confidentiality policies, this
process is called declassification. However, the ability to escape from the strict
confines of noninterference is both essential and dangerous: unregulated use of
downgrading can easily result in unexpected release of confidential information.
Because it is potentially dangerous, downgrading should only be used in certain,
well-defined ways. One could imagine generalizing information-flow security policies
to include specifications of exactly what circumstances permit declassification. The
problem with such an approach is that establishing that a given program meets the
specifications of the security policy can be extremely difficult—it is the problem of
proving that a program meets an arbitrary specification. Moreover, even stating
these formal specifications of security policies is hard because they may require an
accurate description of a very complex piece of software.
For practicality, we need a natural restriction on the use of declassification in
security-typed programming languages. In previous work, Zdancewic and Myers [29]
introduced the idea of robust declassification. Intuitively, the idea is to limit declas-
sification to be used only when the decision to perform the declassification can be
trusted.
As an example, consider a security-typed language implementation of the first
scenario in the list above. Alice owns some private data A. She is willing to release
the data to Bob, but only after he has paid her more than 10 dollars for it. The
code in Figure 1 shows how this situation might be expressed in a security-typed
language.
This program shows how security-typed languages make it possible to program
interesting security policies. It first computes Alice’s secret, giving the result the
confidentiality label {Alice:}, indicating that she owns the data and that she per-
mits no other readers. This is an example of a security label from Myers’ and
Liskov’s decentralized label model [12], which is discussed more in Section 3.
The program next calculates what Bob has paid, and tests whether it is suf-
ficient to satisfy Alice’s requirement. If so, the secret is declassified to have label
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let A:{Alice:} = ... in // compute Alice’s secret
let paid = ... in // determine amount Bob paid
if (paid >= 10) then {
let B:{Alice:Bob} = declassify(A, {Alice:Bob}) in
// ...Bob can make use of the variable B...
} else {
// ...Bob hasn’t paid enough, A is secure...
}
Fig. 1. Example use of declassification
{Alice:Bob}, which says that Alice still owns the policy on the data, but that
Bob is permitted to read it. Policy decisions like this one are made explicit in the
program by requiring that the programmer use the declassify operation to mark
intentional information leaks.
The issue is that because the declassification reveals Alice’s data, she must be
careful that this program is invoked appropriately. Furthermore, even when she
authorizes this program’s use, because the decision to perform the declassification
is based in part on the value paid, she must trust that paid has been computed
as described by the program—that is, she must trust the integrity of the data. If
Bob were somehow able to maliciously tamper with the contents of the paid data or
otherwise influence how it’s value is computed, he could cause Alice’s declassification
to be invoked inappropriately.
This problem is exacerbated in a distributed setting, because the computation
that determines whether declassification should take place can potentially reside
on a different host than the actual declassification itself. Also, if this program
appeared as a service running on one host of a distributed system, determining
whether another host could invoke the service requires authentication to ensure
that Alice’s policy is not violated. Much of the motivation for this work comes
from experience using the Jif, a security-typed variant of Java [13], in distributed
settings [31,32].
The rest of this paper shows how this constraint on the trustworthiness of a
decision to declassify data can be formalized in a type system. The idea is to
extend the security labels to include integrity labels that specify a degree of trust in
data. This extension is easily implementable and provides a natural way of thinking
about when declassification should be permitted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly sketches
a typical security-typed language to set the stage for robust declassification. Sec-
tion 3 describes the decentralized label model and a version with integrity labels.
Section 4 discusses how the integrity constraints can be used to implement robust
declassification and compares that rule with some alternatives. The paper ends
with related work and conclusions.
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`, pc ∈ L Security labels
m` ∈ M Memory cells
t ::= bool Boolean type
| [pc]s→ s Function type
s ::= t` Security types
v ::= t | f Boolean base values
| λx :s. e Functions
| x Variables
e ::= v Values
| e e Function application
| e ⊕ e Primitive operations
| m` Memory cell contents
| m` := e Imperative update
| if e then e else e Conditional
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ | . . . Boolean operations
Fig. 2. λSEC grammar
2 A simple security-typed language
This section briefly sketches a security-typed language called λSEC, whose grammar
is shown in Figure 2. This language is a simplified variant of the SLam calculus,
developed by Heintze and Riecke [7]. A full account of this language and several
extensions are given in the author’s dissertation [28].
In the grammar, ` and pc range over elements of a security lattice, L. The
elements > and ⊥ are the top and bottom elements of L. Points higher in the
lattice represent more confidential information, and points lower in the lattice rep-
resent more public information. The lattice order and join are written v, and unionsq
respectively.
The possible types include the type bool of Boolean values and the types of
functions [pc]s → s. Security types, ranged over by the metavariable s, are just
ordinary types labeled with an element from the security lattice. The security type
of a value describes its confidentiality level. Correspondingly, values, v, include the
Boolean constants for true and false as well as function values. Expressions include
values, primitive Boolean operations such as the logical “and” operation ∧, function
application, and a conditional expression.
The language also includes simple imperative features. The state M consists of
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a globally scoped collection of memory cells that may contain only Boolean values. 2
Each cellm` has a security label indicating the confidentiality of the data it contains.
For simplicity, we give λSEC a large-step operational semantics. The evaluation
relation is of the form e,M ⇓ v,M ′, which means that the (closed) program e
evaluates starting in memory state M to a value v and a new memory state M ′.
The definition of the ⇓ relation is completely standard, so we omit it.
The type system for λSEC is designed to prevent unwanted information flows.
The basic idea is to associate security-labels with the type information of the pro-
gram and then take the confidentiality lattice into account when type checking so
as to rule out illegal (downward) information flows.
Because upward information flows are allowed (e.g. low-confidentiality data may
flow to a high-confidentiality memory cell), the lattice ordering is incorporated as a
subtyping relationship [25], written ` s1 ≤ s2. The subtyping rules (omitted) estab-
lish that ≤ is a reflexive, transitive relation that obeys the expected contravariance
for function types. In addition, the lattice inequality ` v `′ is lifted to subtyping:
` t` ≤ t`′ . This eliminates the need for the programmer to make explicit when
information flows are permissible. For example, we can conclude ` bool⊥ ≤ bool>
because anywhere a high-security Boolean can be safely used, a low-security Boolean
can also be used. Intuitively, if the program is sufficiently secure to protect high-
security data, it also provides sufficient security to “protect” low-security data.
There is a subtlety with security types in the presence of mutable state: There
can be implicit flows that leak information about control flow into the state. Con-
sider the following program, where m⊥ is a memory cell that contains low-security
values and h is a variable of type bool>.
if h then m⊥ := t else m⊥ := f
Here, the problem is that, even though the assignments to m⊥ are individually se-
cure, which of them occurs depends on high-security data. To prevent such implicit
flows, the type system for λSEC associates a label pc with the program counter.
Intuitively, the program counter label approximates the information that can be
learned by observing that the program has reached a particular
2 Other work [30,16] shows how to treat more complex stores that may contain structured data and func-
tions.
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True Γ [pc] ` t : boolpc
False Γ [pc] ` f : boolpc
Var
Γ(x) = s
Γ [pc] ` x : s unionsq pc
Fun
Γ, x :s1 [pc1] ` e : s2 x 6∈ dom(Γ)
Γ [pc2] ` λx :s1. e : ([pc1]s1 → s2)pc2
Binop
Γ [pc] ` e1 : bool`1 Γ [pc] ` e2 : bool`2
Γ [pc] ` e1 ⊕ e2 : bool(`1unionsq`2)
App
Γ [pc1] ` e1 : ([pc2]s2 → s)` Γ [pc1] ` e2 : s2 ` v pc2
Γ [pc1] ` e1 e2 : s unionsq `
Cond
Γ [pc] ` e : bool` Γ [pc unionsq `] ` ei : s i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ [pc] ` if e then e1 else e2 : s
Deref Γ [pc] ` m` : bool` unionsq pc
Assign
Γ [pc] ` e : bool`′ `
′ v `
Γ [pc] ` m` := e : boolpc
Sub
Γ [pc] ` e : s ` s ≤ s′ pc′ v pc
Γ [pc′] ` e : s′
Fig. 3. Typing λSEC
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point during the execution. In the example above, the program counter reveals
the value of h, so inside the branches of the conditional, we have pc = >. To
prevent these implicit flows, the labeled semantics requires that pc v ` whenever
an assignment to a reference m` occurs in the context with program counter label
pc. This rules out the above example.
Another implicit information flow can arise due to the interaction between func-
tions and state. For example, consider a function f that takes a Boolean but only
assigns the location m⊥ the constant t. Function f is defined as:
f
def
= λx :bool>. m⊥ := t
This function is perfectly secure and can be used in many contexts, but it can also
be used to leak information. For example, consider the program below:
m` := f;
if h then f t else t;
This program is insecure because f writes to the low-security memory location m`,
but whether f is invoked depends on secret data h. In general, calls to functions
that have side effects (in this case, writes to memory locations) can leak information
in the same way that assignment leaks information about the program counter.
To detect and rule out such implicit flows, the type system includes effects in
the style of Jouvelot and Gifford [9]. Function types in λSEC include an additional
label; they are of the form [pc]s1 → s2. The label pc is a lower bound on the labels
of any locations that might be written when calling the function. To call a function
of this type in a context where the program counter has label pc′, the type system
requires that pc′ v pc. In the example above, because f writes to a low security
location, f is given the type [⊥]bool> → bool⊥; however, since pc = > inside the
branches of the conditional guarded by h, the call to f in the above program is
ruled out.
These intuitions guide the design of λSEC’s type system, the rules for which are
given in Figure 3. They are judgments of the form Γ [pc] ` e : s, which says “under
the assumptions provided by Γ, the term e is a secure program that evaluates to a
value of type s and does not modify memory cells with label strictly less than pc.”
Although space prohibits full explanation of the type system (see elsewhere [28]
for the details), note that λSEC enjoys the usual type soundness theorems and, more
importantly, we can establish the following noninterference result.
Theorem 2.1 (Noninterference) Suppose ` 6v ζ. If x : t` [⊥] ` e : boolζ and
` v1, v2 : t`, then for all M
e{v1/x},M ⇓ v,M1 ⇔ e{v2/x},M ⇓ v,M2
where M1 ≈ζ M2.
The notation M1 ≈ζ M2 means that memories M1 and M2 agree on cells whose
labels are v ζ:
M1 ≈ζ M2
def
= ∀m`. (` v ζ)⇒M1(m`) = M2(m`)
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Thus, the noninterference theorem says that the low-security results (with label
v ζ) computed by a program deemed secure by the type system are not affected by
altering the value of high-security data (with label 6v ζ).
Note that λSEC, as described so far, does not include a declassification mecha-
nism. Clearly the noninterference theorem will not hold if declassification is added—
the difficulty is in trying to establish properties related to noninterference that do
hold in the presence of declassification.
3 The decentralized label model
One strategy for dealing with declassification is to limit its use to particular parts
of the program. The decentralized label model (DLM) proposed by Myers and
Liskov [12] adds additional structure to the security lattice in order to do exactly
that.
Central to the DLM is the notion of a principal, which is an entity (e.g., user,
process, party) that can have a confidentiality or integrity concern with respect
to data. Principals own information-flow policies and are also used to define the
authority possessed by the running program. The authority A at a point in the
program is a set of principals that are assumed to authorize any action taken by
the program at that point—in particular, principals may authorize declassifications
of data. Different program points may have different authority, which must be
explicitly granted by the principals in question.
A simple confidentiality label in this model is written {o:r1,r2,...,rn}, mean-
ing that the labeled data is owned by principal o, and that o permits the data to
be read by principals r1 through rn (and, implicitly, o). Such a policy is sometimes
abbreviated {o:~r}, where ~r is the set of readers for the policy.
Data may have multiple owners, each controlling a different component of its
label. For example, the label {o1:r1,r2; o2:r1,r3}, contains two components and
says that owner o1 allows readers r1 and r2 and owner o2 allows readers r1 and
r3. The interpretation is that all of the policies described by a label must be
obeyed, only r1 will be able to read data with this annotation. Such composite
labels arise naturally in collaborative computations: for example, if x has label
{o1:r1,r2} and y has label {o2:r1,r3}, then the sum x + y has the composite
label int{o1:r1,r2; o2:r1,r3}, which expresses the conservative requirement that
the sum is subject to both the policy on x and the policy on y.
In the lattice, `1 v `2 if the label `1 is less restrictive than the label `2. Data with
label `1 is less confidential than data with label `2—more principals are permitted to
see the data, and, consequently, there are fewer restrictions on how data with label
`1 may be used. For example, {o:r} v {o:} holds because the left label allows both
o and r to read the data, whereas the right label admits only o as a reader. The
bottom of the DLM confidentiality lattice is the label ⊥ = {} and, when there are n
principals o1 through on, the top of the lattice is the label > = {o1:;...;on:}—all
principals claim sole ownership of the data, so none may read it.
The full definition of v for the decentralized label model is given in Myers’
270
thesis [11]. His thesis also shows that v is a pre-order whose equivalence classes
form a distributive lattice. The label join operation combines the restrictions on
how data may be used. As an example, {o:r1,r2} unionsq {o:r1,r3} = {o:r1}, which
includes the restrictions of both labels
3.1 Integrity constraints
Integrity constraints are the dual to confidentiality constraints. A confidentiality
policy specifies where information may flow to, whereas an integrity policy specifies
where information may flow from.
Integrity policies can also be expressed using the security lattice approach: high-
integrity data has fewer restrictions on how it should be used so should have a label
lower in the security lattice than low-integrity data. Thus, the simplest non-trivial
integrity lattice consists of two labels >, the high-integrity label, and ⊥, the low-
integrity label, but their order is the opposite from the usual confidentiality label:
> v ⊥.
One natural interpretation of an integrity label is a set of principals that trust
the value of a piece of data with the corresponding label. We can extend the
standard confidentiality model with components that specify these simple integrity
constraints. The label {*:p1,...,pn} specifies that principals p1 through pn trust
the data—they believe the data to be computed by the program as written.
In this approach, integrity policies have no owner—the notation “*” is used
to suggest that the owner of the policy does not matter. With this definition,
the integrity label {*:} specifies a piece of data trusted by no principals; it is
the label of completely untrusted data and hence the top of the integrity lattice.
Conversely, if there are n principals p1 through pn, the bottom of the lattice is the
label ⊥ = {*:p1,...,pn}. Data with this label is universally trusted.
This is a weak notion of integrity; it specifies only which principals trust the
data, not how the data may be modified or what invariants that high-integrity
data must satisfy. However, it is sufficient for the purposes of explaining robust
declassification. One can easily generalize this idea to a richer form that is more
fully dual to the DLM owners–readers model by specifying an owners and writers
of the data [12].
Note that the combined confidentiality and integrity lattice can be constructed
by taking the product of the two lattices. Such labels combine integrity and con-
fidentiality components, and they also arise naturally when computing with many
sources of information. For the these extended labels, the functions C(`) and I(`)
respectively extract the confidentiality and integrity parts of `.
4 Declassification
We can now see how the decentralized label model attempts to control the use of
declassification. First consider the simplest way to add a declassification operation
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to a security-typed language. We extend the syntax:
e ::= . . . | declassify(e, `)
The declassify(e, `) expression downgrades the security label in the type of e to
`. To reflect this interpretation, we add the following typing judgment.
Bad-Declassify
Γ [pc] ` e : t`′
Γ [pc] ` declassify(e, `) : t`
This judgment says that a value v with an arbitrary label can be given any other
arbitrary label by declassification. It clearly breaks noninterference because high-
security data can now be made low-security. Declassification is intended for this
purpose, but this rule is too permissive—it can be used at any point to release
confidential information. Consequently, adding such a rule to λSEC completely
invalidates its noninterference theorem. We get no guarantees about the security of
programs that use declassification, and the program may as well have been written
without security types.
The decentralized label model introduces the notion of authority to allow coarse-
grained control over where declassifications may be used. The idea is to associate a
set of principals, the code’s authority, with each portion of the program. Because
the DLM labels include information about which principals own the policies on
the data, it is straightforward to determine which principals’ policies are being
weakened by a given declassify operation. A principal p’s authority is needed to
perform declassifications of data owned by p. For example, owner o can add a
reader r to a piece of data x by declassifying its label from {o:} to {o:r} using the
expression declassify(x, {o:r}).
We use the function auth(`, `′) to determine the set of principals whose au-
thority is needed to move from label ` to label `′ in the lattice. For example,
auth({o:}, {o:r}) = {o}. In general, when C(`) = {o1:~r1;...;on:~rn} and C(`
′) =
{o′1:~r
′
1;...;o
′
m:~r
′
m}, the definition of required authority is:
auth(`, `′) = { o | o = oi = o
′
j ∧ ~r
′
j ⊃ ~ri}
To incorporate the DLM notion of authority into the type system, we extend
the security part of the typing context to include A, the set of principals that have
authorized the program being checked. This gives DLM typing judgments the form
Γ [pc, A] ` e : s. We can now give the DLM rule for declassification.
DLM-Declassify
Γ [pc, A] ` e : t` auth(`, `
′) ⊆ A
Γ [pc, A] ` declassify(e, `′) : t`′
In addition, the type of this DLM function should reflect the authority needed
to invoke the function, just as λSEC’s function types include the pc from the security
context. Therefore, the typing rule for functions is:
DLM-Fun
Γ, x :s′ [pc′, A′] ` e : s
Γ [pc, A] ` λx :s′. e : ([A′, pc′]s′ → s)pc
The function type [pc′, A]s′ → s indicates that the function requires authority A and
so may perform declassifications on behalf of the principals in A. The programmer
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can delimit where declassifications may take place by constraining the types assigned
to the possible clients of a given function.
The caller of a function must establish that it has the authority necessary to
carry out any of the declassifications that might occur inside the function call. This
requirement is reflected in the function application rule:
DLM-App
Γ [pc, A] ` e : ([pc′, A′]s′ → s)`
Γ [pc, A] ` e′ : s′
A′ ⊆ A ` v pc′
Γ [pc, A] ` e e′ : s
Under this model, the example program from Figure 1 would require Alice’s
authority to run, because auth({Alice:}, {Alice:Bob}) is the set {Alice}.
One could imagine using authority in other ways. For example, it would be easy
to adjust this type system to allow functions to be endowed with some fixed au-
thority. This approach would allow some of the authority to come from a function’s
calling context and some authority to belong to the function itself.
The benefit of this approach is that whenever a program is well typed under a se-
curity context with authority A, it is guaranteed not to leak confidential information
owned by principals not in A.
4.1 Robust declassification
Despite the increased control of downgrading offered by the decentralized label
model, there is a weakness in its simple, authority-based approach. The problem is
illustrated once again by the example in Figure 1. Even though Alice’s authority
is necessary for the declassification to be carried out, it is not sufficient to ensure
that her security policy, as encoded in the program is not violated. The problem is
that the decision to perform the declassification is affected by the contents of paid,
which may not be trusted by Alice.
Rather than give authority to the entire function body, it seems more natural to
associate the required authority with the decision to perform the declassification.
The program-counter label at the point of a declassify expression is already a
model of the information used to reach the declassification. Therefore, to ensure
that the decision to do the declassification is sufficiently trusted, we simply require
that the program counter have high enough integrity.
These intuitions are captured in the following rule for declassification:
Robust-Declassify
Γ [pc] ` e : t` I(`) = I(`
′) I(pc) v {*:auth(`, `′)}
Γ [pc] ` declassify(e, `′) : t`′
This approach equates the authority of a piece of code with the integrity of the
program counter at the start of the code, simultaneously simplifying the typing
rules—no authority context A is needed—and strengthening the restrictions on
where declassification is permitted.
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This version of declassification rules out the program in Figure 1. To allow this
program to typecheck, the programmer would be forced to add Alice’s integrity
constraint {*:Alice} to the variable paid. Doing so would force the calculation of
paid to depend only on data that Alice deems trustworthy.
The benefit of tying declassification to integrity is that the noninterference proofs
given for the security-typed language say something meaningful for programs that
include declassification. Note that the declassification operation does not change
the integrity of the data being declassified. Projecting the noninterference result
onto the integrity sublattice yields the following lemma as a corollary. It is a weak
guarantee: Intuitively, low-integrity data cannot interfere with what data is declas-
sified.
Lemma 4.1 (Robust Declassification) Suppose that x : s[⊥] ` e : s′ and the
integrity labels satisfy I(label(s)) 6v I(label(s′)). Then for any values v1 and v2 such
that ` vi : s it is the case that e{v1/x} ⇓ v ⇔ e{v2/x} ⇓ v.
This lemma holds regardless of whether e contains declassification operations.
This lemma does not say anything about what high-security information might be
declassified. Nevertheless, it is better than giving up all security properties when
declassifications are used. Moreover, using the integrity constraint still implies the
property guaranteed by the DLM authority model: If Γ [pc] ` e : s and I(pc) 6v
{*:p} then e cannot contain any declassifications on p’s behalf.
One could generalize robust declassification by associating with each distinct
declassification expression in the program a separate principal d and requiring that
I(pc) v {?:d} in the declassification typing judgment. This constraint allows the
programmer to name particular declassifications in security policies so that, for
instance a value with integrity label {?:d1, d2} could possibly be declassified at
points d1 and d2 but not at a declassification associated with point d3 in the program.
Whether such a generalization would be useful in practice, and how to precisely
characterize the confidentiality properties of the resulting programs remains for
future work.
5 Related work
There has been much recent work in security-typed languages, ranging from simple
calculi [25,7,1,21,24,30,23,8] to full-featured languages [10,31,16,2]. For a recent
survey of this work, see Sabelfeld and Myers’ paper [20].
The simplest and most standard approach to declassification is to restrict its
uses to those performed by a trusted subject, similar to the DLM requirement that
a function possess the proper authority. This approach does not address the ques-
tion of whether an information channel is created. Many systems have incorporated
a more limited form of declassification. Ferrari et al. [4] augment information flow
controls in an object-oriented system with a form of dynamically-checked declassi-
fication called waivers. However, these efforts provide only limited characterization
of the safety of declassification.
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Pottier and Conchon [15] argue that access control and information flow are
orthogonal issues, and that the use of declassification mechanisms can be moderated
by access controls. This proposal seems similar to Jif’s use of authority declarations.
Whether access control alone is sufficient in practice to regulate declassification
remains for future research.
The interplay between authority and declassification is similar to Java’s stack
inspection security model [27,26,5]. In Java, privileged operations can require that
they be invoked only in the context of some authorization clause, and, that, dy-
namically, no untrusted methods are between the authorization and the use of the
privileged operation on the call stack. These constraints on the run-time stack
are similar to the authority constraints used in the decentralized label model, but
weaker than the robust declassification mechanism proposed here. The difference
is that the stack-inspection approach does not track the integrity of data returned
by an untrusted piece of code, so untrusted data might still influence privileged
operations.
Using untrusted data to regulate privileged operations is related to buffer over-
flow bugs found in C programs. The C libraries assume that strings are properly
delimited and do not check their bounds. (The libraries assume that the strings
have high integrity.) Programs use the libraries without appropriate checks, mak-
ing them vulnerable to using strings read from an untrusted source such as the
network. Analyses that find such format string vulnerabilities in C [22] are similar
to integrity-only information-flow analysis.
Intransitive noninterference policies [19,14,18] generalize noninterference to de-
scribe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Be-
vier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing
policies for information released to a set of agents.
6 Conclusions
Security-typed languages are a promising and flexible approach to the problem of
protecting confidential data in computer systems. Practical security-typed lan-
guages provide a rich vocabulary for building security policies, which are enforced
by static program analyses. Although strict noninterference is a valuable starting
point for developing information flow policies, it is sometimes necessary to violate
noninterference in practice. Therefore, some form of downgrading mechanism is
required.
This paper presents a type system for robust declassification, which is an attempt
to control improper use of downgrading. The main intuition is that the decision to
perform a declassification must be trusted by any principals whose security policies
are weakened by the declassification. This insight leads naturally to an integrity
constraint on the data used to make the decision. In addition, simple modifications
to existing security type systems can implement robust declassification.
Although this approach is promising, there is still further research necessary to
understand how downgrading mechanisms affect information-flow security policies.
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For instance, this paper has focused exclusively on declassification, but once in-
tegrity constraints are included it is natural to ask how declassification’s integrity
counterpart (called endorsement) should be similarly constrained. In addition, it
is not clear how downgrading mechanisms should interact with polymorphism and
mechanisms for describing dynamic security policies.
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